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Taylor	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  claimed	  that	  New	  Caledonian	  crows	  are	  capable	  of	  reasoning	  about	  
“hidden	   causal	   agents.”	   Their	   recorded	   increases	   in	   hide	   inspections	   and	   abandoned	  
trials	   in	  the	  unknown	  causal	  agent	  (UCA)	  condition	  relative	  to	  the	  human	  causal	  agent	  
(HCA)	   condition,	  which	  were	   used	   to	   infer	   the	   presence	   of	   “causal	   reasoning”	   ability,	  
are,	  however,	  confounded	  by	  a	  fundamental	  methodological	  limitation.	  
Test	   trials	   of	   the	   two	   experimental	   conditions	   were	   administered	   in	   a	   fixed	  
order:	  The	  HCA	  trials	  always	  preceded	  the	  UCA	  trials.	  To	  overcome	  the	  likely	  impact	  of	  
order	  effects,	  it	  is	  customary	  for	  researchers	  to	  experimentally	  cross	  the	  manipulation	  of	  
interest	  with	  the	  order	  of	  testing,	  a	  practice	  called	  counterbalancing.	  Thus,	  although	  it	  is	  
unclear	   why	   counterbalancing	  was	   not	   employed,	   it	   is	   plausible	   that	   performance	   on	  
UCA	   trials	   was	   influenced	   by	   prior	   exposure	   to	   HCA	   trials.	   This	   being	   the	   case,	   the	  
findings	  of	  Taylor	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  are	  uninterpretable.	  
The	  authors	  were	  surely	  aware	  of	   this	  confound	  because	   they	  contrasted	   their	  
“causal	   reasoning”	   account	  with	   an	   account	   based	   on	   habituation	   and	   predicted	   that	  
habituation	  should	  result	  in	  fewer	  inspections	  across	  trials.	  It	  is	  questionable,	  however,	  
whether	   the	  effect	   of	   repeated	  exposure	   to	   the	   stick	   (or	   indeed	   the	  passage	  of	   time)	  
would	  necessarily	   result	   in	  habituation.	  Repeated	  exposure	   to	  a	   stimulus	  can	   result	   in	  
sensitization,	   an	   increase	   in	   responsiveness	  with	   repeated	   stimulation	   (Groves,	   1970);	  
thus,	   the	   observed	   pattern	   of	   behavior	   could	   have	   been	   obtained	   irrespective	   of	   the	  
specific	   details	   of	   the	   experimental	   conditions.	   Repeated	   stimulus	   pairings	   can	   also	  
result	   in	   the	   acquisition	   of	   conditioned	   responding	   through	   associative	   learning	   (e.g.,	  
Dickinson,	  1980).	  Thus,	  crows	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  observe	  repeated	  pairings	  of	  the	  
hide	  and	  the	  aversive	  probing	  of	  the	  stick,	  permitting	  the	  acquisition	  of	  an	  aversion	  to	  
the	  hide	  regardless	  of	  condition.	  
Taylor	  et	  al.’s	  study	  raised	  many	  interesting	  questions,	  particularly	  the	  question	  
of	   which	   features	   of	   HCA	   and	   UCA	   exposure	   might	   contribute	   to	   differences	   in	   the	  
crows’	  behavior.	  In	  the	  HCA	  condition,	  two	  humans	  entered	  the	  aviary;	  one	  disappeared	  
from	  sight,	  and	  the	  stick	  was	  moved	  from	  within	  the	  hide.	  One	  human	  reappeared	  and	  
exited,	  and	  was	  then	  followed	  by	  the	  second	  human.	  In	  the	  UCA	  condition,	  one	  human	  
entered	   the	   aviary,	   the	   stick	   was	  moved	   from	   outside	   the	   hide,	   and	   the	   human	   left.	  
These	  two	  conditions	  therefore	  differ	  in	  several	  ways	  (e.g.,	  number	  of	  people	  observed,	  
time	   courses	   and	   spatial	   locations	   of	   these	   people,	   manner	   in	   which	   the	   stick	   was	  
moved).	   However,	   these	   interesting	   questions	   can	   only	   be	   addressed	   once	   it	   is	  
unambiguously	  demonstrated	   that	   the	  observed	  data	  were	  a	   consequence	  of	   the	   two	  
conditions,	   and	   this	   can	   only	   be	   achieved,	   within	   subjects,	   using	   a	   counterbalanced	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